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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA-A (M) (21 Jun 71) FOR OT UT 704266

8 July 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 93d
Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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
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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 93D MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96238

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (E)

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1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Mission. The Commanding Officer, 93d Military Police Battalion provides Military Police and Provost Marshal services to sub-area coordinators, tactical units, commanders without organic military police, and others, as directed by the Commanding Officer, 16th Military Police Group.

b. Organization. See enclosed organizational chart.

c. Personnel, Morale and Discipline.

(1) Decorations:

(a) Legion of Merit.	1
(b) Soldier's Medal.	5
(c) Bronze Star with "V"	18
(d) Bronze Star Meritorious.	21
(e) Air Medal.	0
(f) Army Commendation Medal with "V"	45
(g) Army Commendation Medal Meritorious.	74
(h) Purple Heart	9
(i) Brigade Certificates of Achievement.	55

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(2) Key Personnel Assignments and Departures:

(a) Assignments:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>JOB TITLE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
SIMPSON, MARCINE	MSG	1SG	17 Aug 70
ROBINSON, RAYMOND	SFC	Plt Sgt	18 Aug 70
DUFFY, JAMES P. JR.	LTC	CO	21 Aug 70
COLE, THEODORE R.	MAJ	S3	15 Sep 70
LIVELY, ROBERT	CPT	CO, 560th	28 Sep 70
POTTS, HARRY	CPT	CO, 66th	19 Sep 70
GREENWALD, DONALD	MAJ	PMO, QNH	17 Sep 70
LANG, JAMES	CPT	S4	15 Sep 70
MANCIL, EDWARD	MSG	Opns, PMO	5 Oct 70
MELE, ACHILLE	CSM	CSM	20 Oct 70

(b) Departures:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>JOB TITLE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
ROUSE, NORMAN	1SG	1SG	1 Aug 70
BRIGHT, ROBERT	1SG	1SG	3 Aug 70
PRICE, AUBREY	CPT	PMO, PKU	6 Aug 70
MILLER, JAMES C.	LTC	CO	8 Aug 70
JONES, RICHARD	CPT	S3	18 Aug 70
BLACKWELL, LEO	PSG	Plt Sgt	22 Aug 70
HARPER, JAMES	CPT	Phy Sec	26 Aug 70
CASSELL, EARNEST	PSG	Plt Sgt	3 Sep 70
MARTINO, DOMINIC	SFC	S4 Sgt	17 Sep 70
WALLACE, KENNETH	SFC	Act 1SG	20 Sep 70
LANGBERG, VERNON	SFC	Opns, PMO	21 Sep 70
PETERS, WENTON	1LT	Plt Ldr	30 Sep 70
COLE, KERMIT	CPT	S2	19 Oct 70
HARTING, BRUCE	CPT	CO, 560th	20 Oct 70
MEDLEY, NEIL	1LT	Plt Ldr	23 Oct 70
BELL, FRED	MAJ	CO, 177th	25 Oct 70
LYONS, STEVEN	CPT	CO, 66th	28 Oct 70

(3) Casualties:

(a) Battle Losses:	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>1</u> Killed	0	0	0	0
<u>2</u> Wounded	3	0	1	4

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(b) Non-Battle Losses: OFF WO EM TOTAL

1 Killed 0 0 2 2

2 Injured 0 0 0 0

(4) Reenlistments: Eligible Reenlistments

(a) 1st Term RA 29 0

(b) RA Career 4 4

(c) AUS 62 0

(d) Other 0 0

(e) Total 95 4

(5) Civilian Personnel: Authorized Employed

(a) Program Six Civilianization 8 8

(b) Augmentation TDA P5-WFPEAA-99
Dated 1 Jan 69 29 26

(c) Total 37 34

(6) R & R: Month %Utilized

Aug 100%
Sep 100%
Oct 100%

(7) Strengths:

(a) As of 1 Aug 70.

<u>AUTH</u>				<u>ASG</u>			
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
24	2	655	681	22	2	508	532

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(b) As of 31 Oct 70.

<u>AUTH</u>				<u>ASG</u>			
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
24	2	655	681	25	2	516	543

(8) Extensions of Overseas Tours:

(a) Total Extensions	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Aug	0	18	18
Sep	0	8	8
Oct	0	16	16

(b) Under PL 89-735 (6 no)	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Aug	0	4	4
Sep	0	3	3
Oct	0	5	5

(9) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) General Courts	0
(b) Special Courts	4
(c) Summary Courts	0
(d) Article 15, UCMJ	57

(10) Congressional Inquiries: 7

(11) Publications:

- (a) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #18 (EER), 10 Aug 70.
- (b) 93d MP Bn Command Policy and Guidance Letter, 7 Sep 70.
- (c) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #19 (Drug Amnesty Program).
- (d) 93d MP Bn Commander's Policy Statement #20 (Reenlistment Program).

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d. Operations:

(1) During the reporting period, the 93d Military Police Battalion's area of responsibility extended from the Cambodian border on the west to the South China Sea to the east, and from the MR I southern border to the southern boundaries of the provinces of Phu Yen, Phu Ben, and Pleiku. The five provinces in the 93d Military Police Battalion's area of responsibility are Binh Dinh, Pleiku, Kontum, Phu Ben, and Phu Yen.

(2) The 93d Military Police Battalion provided military police resources in the following manner:

(a) General support of combat units. The 93d MP Bn provides one MP squad in general support of the 173d Airborne Bde at LZ Uplift.

(b) Control of prisoners of war (PW) in US custody.

1 The 93d MP Bn guarded a total of 56 PW's during this reporting period at the 17th Field Hospital, An Khe; 67th Evac Hospital, Qui Nhon; and the 71st Evac Hospital, Pleiku.

2 A total of 63 PW's were escorted from PW Hospitals and LZ English to ARVN PW camps and hospitals by the 93d MP Bn.

(c) Specialized Physical Security Measures.

1 Utilizing resources of the 458th Trans Co (PBR), the 93d MP Bn provides waterborne security for the Qui Nhon Inner Harbor and the Vung Ro Bay Harbor. At Qui Nhon, security is intensified around three (3) large electropower ships (Vinnel Corp), a DeLong Pier, an LST Beach/Can Dock area, and the approaches to the harbor causeway. Four watercraft (2 PBR's, 2 Boston Whalers) are used for night security and three watercraft (2 PBR's, 1 Boston Whaler) are utilized during daylight hours. At Vung Ro Bay, the primary security mission has been the security of petroleum ships moored in the bay and their fuel lines running to land-based pumping stations. During the hours of darkness, two watercraft (1 PBR, 1 Boston Whaler) have been used to perform this mission. During the daytime, one watercraft (PBR) has been utilized. With the assistance of VN National Maritime Police an average of 86 Vietnamese watercraft are searched daily and approximately 20 Vietnamese are detained monthly. During the reporting period, 7 confirmed enemy were captured and released to Vietnamese authorities.

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2 The 93d MP Bn provides on-board security for ships carrying AAFEX supplies and ammo ships loading and unloading in the Qui Nhon Inner Harbor. During this reporting period, the 93d MP Bn provided two MP security personnel per ship to guard an average of four ships per month. Each ship remains in the harbor approximately three days.

3 The 1st platoon, 981st MP Co (SD) at Phu Tai, attached to the 66th MP Co, has provided an average of 36 sentry dogs each night, walking 10 posts per shift at the ASP, Phu Tai; 6 posts per shift at Lane Army Airfield, An Son; and 2 posts per shift at Tank Farm #2, Qui Nhon. The 3rd platoon, 981st MP Co (SD) at Fleiku, attached to the 560th MP Co, has provided an average of 34 sentry dogs each night, walking 3 posts per shift at the POL storage area, Fleiku; 8 posts per shift at the ISA area, Fleiku; and 6 posts per shift at Camp Holloway in Fleiku. In An Khe, 16 sentry dogs have been utilized each night walking 4 posts per shift at the ASP; 1 post per shift at the Class I yard; 1 post per shift at the Class II & IV yard; and 2 posts per shift at the POL Tank Farm.

4 The 66th MP Co and the 560th MP Co have had unit responsibility for convoy escort within their areas of responsibility. These units utilize 22 armored cars (XM 706) and 30 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton scout jeeps in escorting convoys. They provide escort for convoys on QL-1, QL-14, and QL-19 throughout MR 2 (North). These units have escorted 2,236 convoys over 158,090.8 miles during the reporting period.

5 During this reporting period, the 93d MP Bn provided 14 VIP escorts. Each escort consisted of one or two $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton vehicles with two to four military policemen. Combined Police patrols were used on occasions when VIP visits were off US installations.

6 During the reporting period, the 93d MP Bn supported a construction operation with defile and traffic control in Qui Nhon, using Combined Police patrols at a rate of one patrol (1 MP, 1 NP, and one QC) per day. The project was the laying of a railroad spur from Gia Long Street, Qui Nhon to the Ammo Pier, Qui Nhon Port, by RMK Construction Company.

(d) Discipline, Law and Order (DL&O).

1 The 93d MP Bn utilized a total of 35 day/nighttime military police patrols throughout its area of operations. These patrols perform traffic control, highway patrol, and general DL&O missions.

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2 The 93d MP Bn utilized a total of 22 day/nighttime combined patrols throughout its area of operation.

3 Military police reports initiated during the reporting quarter totaled 2,278.

4 Radar and mirror boxes have been utilized daily throughout the 93d MP Bn's area of responsibility. As a result, 1,461 traffic citations were issued. Of 2 radar units assigned, 1 is non-operational due to a faulty transistor.

5 The 93d MP Bn processed 175 Serious Incident Reports (SIR) during the reporting period.

6 The 93d MP Bn established a program of Aerial Detection and Identification of Speeders (ADIOS). Aircraft are being used to augment and support traffic operations by monitoring convoy movements, identifying congestion, measuring speed of individual vehicles, and providing a versatile deterrent to hazardous driving. Every effort is made to employ aircraft 4 hours per day, 7 days per week. Priority employment is along QL-1 from the northern border of MR 2 to Tuy Hoa, a distance of about 200 road miles. Secondary employment is along the eastern portion of QL-19 from Qui Nhon to, but not including, the An Khe Pass, a distance of about 30 miles. Combined Police patrols have been integrated into the program. Road markings at 176' intervals are being used to clock vehicles from the air. During the reporting period, 1,296 vehicles have been timed. Citations have been issued to 179 US military drivers, 20 ROK's, and 21 ARVN. Publicity has been aggressively undertaken through briefing of local commanders, AFVN radio spot announcements, and coordination through 18th MP Bde for Stars & Stripes newspaper coverage. Drivers appear to be cognizant of the program. The psychological impact on driver behavior is the single most important benefit of the ADIOS program.

(7) On 24 Oct 70, military police activities at Kontum were closed out and all resources returned to the 560th MP Co.

e. Training.

(1) Guardmount training is conducted daily by all units.

(2) The 66th Military Police Company has the responsibility for providing indirect fire support for Camp Gheradhini Compound, where they are located. Utilizing an 81 mm mortar, they have trained personnel in the operation of the weapon and in fire directional control procedures.

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(3) OJT training of FVMAF military police is accomplished through the use of combined patrols. Combined patrols are trained in mirror box operation and other traffic control and law enforcement techniques.

f. Intelligence - Counterintelligence.

(1) The primary sources of combat intelligence are the individual military policemen, elements of MACV, and tactical units.

(2) The primary sources of police intelligence are local Provost Marshals, CID detachments, 16th MP Gp, and 18th MP Bde, and Vietnamese National and military police (QC).

(3) A weekly intelligence summary is published by the battalion S2/3 section. This summarizes enemy activity for the past week that affects MP operations in cities or along highways. It also contains a brief analysis of general enemy activity in the 93d MP Bn AO and an estimate of enemy intentions.

(4) Following are the sources of intelligence:

(a) Individual military policemen.

(b) Daily intelligence summaries of II CTZ, 4th Inf Div, USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon, and the five province MACV advisory teams.

(c) Periodic Intelligence Report, IFORCEV.

(d) Interrogation Reports from MACV Sectors and 22nd ARVN Div.

(e) Liaison with various intelligence units in the area of operations; i.e., 172d MI Det, 524th MI Det, 525th MI Det.

g. Force Development. On 15 Oct 70, the 66th MP Co relocated 2 squads to Tuy Hoa AFB as an initial step in assuming DL&O responsibility for that location. Further deployments and relocations are planned during the next reporting period.

h. Communications.

(1) During the reporting period, additional radio relay stations were established at location Blackhawk, about 15 miles east of Pleiku and at Song Cau; thus providing radio communications capability between all Bn locations.

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(2) Two RTT units assigned to the battalion were located at Camp Schmidt, Pleiku, and Camp Keystone, Qui Nhon. A total of 490 messages were sent and 285 messages received during this reporting period. Difficulty has been experienced in keeping the unit at Pleiku operational due to mechanical/electrical failures.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) The loss of potential Army career men.

(a) OBSERVATION: Through the programs offered by the Veterans Administration and the GI Bill, the United States Government is making it more and more beneficial for the young soldier to leave the service. As a result, the service is losing many personnel of high caliber.

(b) EVALUATION: Many personnel are leaving the service after a normal two year obligation because there is a better opportunity for them to continue their education after separation from the Army. Although the Army has many educational programs available to qualified career soldiers, none of them can compare to the educational opportunities offered by the GI Bill and the Veterans Administration. Unless he is selected for an Army sponsored schooling program, the active service member must attend school during non-duty hours and pay 50% of the tuition. Many times it is impossible or impractical to attend this type of program due to duty commitments. The individual with initiative and desire to seek self improvement leaves the service to take advantage of the schooling available to him.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The existing degree completion program should either be broadened or liberalized and made available to more personnel, or a similar program should be initiated that would offer the potential career soldier the same opportunity available to the individual who sometimes grudgingly spends two years in the service and makes no worthwhile contribution. The program should obligate the man for a specific period of time for each year that he has spent away from active duty. The above program would encourage more men to make a career out of the military service and would improve the quality of the career soldier as well.

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(2) Reassignment for newly promoted Sergeants E5.

(a) OBSERVATION: Newly promoted sergeants E5 often have a difficult time extracting themselves from the familiar relationship they have established with their former peers and elevating themselves to the position of authority their newly acquired rank dictates. They also have a difficult time associating with and developing a comfortable working relationship with fellow NCO's who were formerly their superiors.

(b) EVALUATION: Because of this difficulty in exerting authority over former peers, the new sergeant may not be as efficient or effective as he otherwise might be. The challenges inherent in the new position of responsibility are compounded by personal stresses that might lead to compromising the new NCO's objectivity and thereby losing the respect and cooperation of his superiors and subordinates.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Upon promotion to sergeant E5, the individual should be transferred to another unit or another job. This policy could be easily implemented within a Battalion or Group. This would eliminate the ramifications of too close a relationship with subordinates and allow him to establish rapport with a different group of NCO's.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Enemy tactics.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy employed a coordinated attack on both QL-19 and the local fire support bases during the reporting period. A westbound convoy escorted by the 560th Military Police Company came under heavy enemy fire at the base of the Miang Giang Pass (BR 245506). Simultaneously, LZ Action (BR 267476), the nearest location containing a reaction force, received 7 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire; thus hampering artillery and reaction support for the ambushed convoy.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy has changed their tactics to effect coordinated attacks.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That firebases in the near proximity to main supply routes be made aware of this change in enemy tactics.

(2) Security of Billets.

(a) OBSERVATION: Sappers continue to employ new methods in attempts to incur personal injuries and billet destruction to US personnel.

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Sappers, through the use of satchel charges, destroyed the doors of several troop billets and then sprayed the floor area with automatic small arms fire.

(b) EVALUATION: Sappers are aware of the US practice of locking all billets doors, and when under attack getting as low as possible to the ground.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That when possible, all troop areas to include billets' doors be well-illuminated, and that all troop billets be locked, with a guard on duty inside at all times during the night.

c. Operations:

(1) Convoy Escort.

(a) OBSERVATION: Convoy escort and security personnel are remaining at the scene of an ambush after the convoy has cleared the kill zone, thus leaving it unprotected for the remainder of its movement to its destination.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy has initiated numerous sniper incidents at convoys in an attempt to evaluate the actions of all organic and reaction security forces. Noting that the organic security forces remained at the scene of the sniping incident and abandoned their convoy, the enemy changed his tactics. His new plan called for a sniping incident on a convoy, thus drawing off the convoy's organic security, and then the initiation of a full scale ambush a few miles farther down the road. An ambush, such as that mentioned above occurred with the sniping incident taking place off QL-19 Bridge 31 (BR 097552), with a full scale ambush being initiated at Bridge 33 (BR C32513). Fortunately the tactical error of the convoy's security forces had been observed and corrected, thus preventing a successful ambush on the part of the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the enemy's new tactic be brought to the attention of all units securing and escorting convoys on main supply routes, and that this tactic be incorporated in the LOI of all concerned branch schools.

(2) Traffic Control Using Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: UH1B helicopters are being used to support aircraft traffic control and enforcement operations.

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(b) EVALUATION: One current criticism of the program concerns the cost of operating helicopters for this purpose. There is some "over-kill", since the helicopter requires a crew of four and has space for four passengers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A Light Observation Helicopter (LOH), requiring only the pilot and one space for a Military Policeman, would be adequate and permit more economical operation.

(3) Convoy Security.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy has been employing harassing fire on the highway quite frequently.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy has conducted numerous small scale ambushes on Highway QL-19 between BN 30 (BR 144535) and BN 33 (BR 033514). These ambushes have incurred little, or no damage, thus leading one to believe that there is some other reason for the action. Most of the ambushes have consisted of a few B-40 rockets and small arms fire. It would appear the enemy is attempting to establish a pattern of reaction on the part of convoys and road security vehicles.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all convoy escort and road security vehicles be conscious of ammunition economy. Thus, if the enemy should stage one of these small scale ambushes, these vehicles would not expend all of their organic ammunition, leaving the road vulnerable to a larger ambush.

(4) Detention of Deserters by Military Police.

(a) OBSERVATION: Several deserters were apprehended and detained by military police pending disposition. Each deserter was detained from 8 to 10 days. Units from which they deserted are under the impression that once an individual is dropped from the rolls, the unit is relieved of all responsibilities, even though the deserter is returned to military control. The time lapse takes place when USARV has to be contacted for assistance. USARV then notifies the unit through channels to receipt for the detainee.

(b) EVALUATION: Most Unit Commanders are not receiving proper instructions relative to the disposition of deserters returned to military control.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That appropriate directives and/or guidance be published.

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d. Organization: None.

e. Training:

(1) Training of MP's.

(a) OBSERVATION: Military policemen arriving in RVN are deficient in the basic skills required to perform DL&O duty and traffic accident investigation.

(b) EVALUATION: Either a lack of motivation or a lack of proper training is resulting in a large number of sub-standard military policemen arriving in Vietnam. Since the present manpower level and required commitments necessitate continuous 12 hour shifts the only possible training time available is at night, during the man's off duty hours. While this unit has found it necessary to follow this plan for a three week course in basic military police skills, constant use of the individuals' off duty hours for training will invariably result in a lowering of morale and efficiency. A man cannot be expected to be alert in class after working a 12 hour shift.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Efforts be intensified at AIT level to screen out those individuals who have poor motivation or potential.

(2) More extensive training be given to AIT students in the area of traffic accident investigation. In Vietnam, traffic accidents constitute a major part of a patrolman's duties.

(3) Mandatory training subjects be drastically reduced in Vietnam since time available for training is almost non-existent.

f. Logistics:

(1) M-73 Machine Guns.

(a) OBSERVATION: The 560th Military Police Company has experienced problems with the M-73 machine guns.

(b) EVALUATION: The spot welds of the feed tray assembly are constantly cracking, causing the guns to malfunction.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this information be passed on to the manufacturer as a deficiency.

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31 October 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Barrel locking lever on the M-60 machine gun.

(a) OBSERVATION: Often the barrel locking lever on the M-60 machine gun is inadvertently moved into an upright position during transportation or utilization of the weapon. Unless carefully observed just prior to firing, the barrel locking lever could be in an upright position which disengages the barrel from the weapon.

(b) EVALUATION: The upright position of the barrel locking lever is easily unnoticed. Therefore, an operator of the M-60 machine gun might fire the weapon with the barrel disengaged resulting in serious bodily harm to the operator and damage to the weapon.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A type of locking device should be developed on the barrel locking lever to insure that it could not accidentally be pushed or jarred into the upright position. Also, the underside of the barrel locking lever should be painted a bright color so as to be conspicuous to the operator before firing the weapon.

(3) Windshields for XM-706 armored car.

(a) OBSERVATION: Drivers of the armored car XM-706 are constantly exposed to dust, insects, pebbles, rain, and mud.

(b) EVALUATION: Although the drivers wear goggles, this offers only limited protection. The rest of their face is still exposed to insects and rocks and the dust makes breathing difficult. One unit is currently employing a home-made windshield consisting of a one foot square piece of plexiglass welded in front of the driver. This offers excellent protection against insects, rocks, dust, rain, and mud. The windshield is tilted slightly to the rear to allow the airstream to keep the glass free from raindrops.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Consideration be given to developing a standard windshield for the XM-706. For optimum utilization, this windshield should be mounted so it can be dropped down when not required.

(4) Mirror Boxes.

(a) OBSERVATIONS: Mirror boxes are frequently rendered inoperative because of broken mirrors or broken stop watches.

(b) EVALUATION: Usually, the only means of replacing broken mirrors is to buy them on the local economy. Stop watches are practically impossible to repair in Vietnam, or to procure from normal supply sources since they are not included in MP unit TO&E's.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That sheets of polished metal be used to replace the mirrors in the boxes. This will eliminate the mirror breakage. Such devices have been successfully employed by units of this Battalion. Stop watches should be added to the MTOE's of MP units or PM Detachments.

(5) Slave cylinders for XM-706 armored car.

(a) OBSERVATION: A repair part for the armored car XM-706, a slave cylinder, has been requisitioned through normal military channels. The slave cylinders received had been modified and do not assemble properly on the vehicle.

(b) EVALUATION: The slave cylinder FSN 2520-934-2340 differs from the original model. Installation of the model received required that it be mounted at a 90 degree angle different from the slave cylinder it replaced. Due to the lack of space and the difference in the mounting angle, the new models now being received through supply channels cannot be installed. An Equipment Improvement Recommendation has been submitted through channels. Modification at unit level can be made on the slave cylinder to fit the XM-706 but it requires welding that sometimes distorts the cylinder and makes it non-repairable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A study be made to determine why the cylinder bracket was modified and how the old model can be obtained.

(6) Personnel Stretchers.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a need for armored cars XM-706 to carry personnel stretchers.

(b) EVALUATION: The 560th MP Company has had two incidents demonstrating the need for the stretcher. On one occasion, an intoxicated ARVN soldier was struck by a US Army vehicle. An XM-706 was on the scene. An RF squad was ambushed near BN 34 on QL-19, with one man being critically injured. Since a Dustoff helicopter could not be made available immediately, an XM-706 transported the injured man to a medical facility.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That personnel stretchers (litters) be made an integral part of the armored car XM-706. They are easily mounted on the front of the vehicle.

(7) Rear Ends on XM-706 armored car.

(a) OBSERVATION: Difficulty has been experienced in maintaining rear differentials on the XM-706.

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(b) EVALUATION: The XM-706 rear differential, Federal stock number 2520-934-1736, is unavailable through support maintenance channels. A 2½-ton truck rear differential, Federal stock number 2520-792-6098, has been used as the replacement part. Although these have proved to be satisfactory, they do not have the same life span as the XM-706 rear differential.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That extra efforts be made to make the XM-706 rear differential available.

(g) Tire rims for XM-706.

(a) OBSERVATION: Every time a unit has requisitioned tire, rim FSN 2530-287-5701, it has received a truck rim FSN 2530-934-2360.

(b) EVALUATION: While the truck rim is the same size as the XM-706 rim, it has a different number of bolts and will not fit the armored car. "Do Not Substitute" codes on requisitions and letters to the maintenance facility have brought no results.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Determine at what level this substitute item is listed and make necessary corrections.

g. Communications:

(1) Improvement of the RT 524 radio.

(a) OBSERVATION: The A5100, A5200, or the A4300 modules in the squelch or power circuit on the RT 524 radio burn out if the vehicle is started while the radio is on.

(b) EVALUATION: Often the operator of a vehicle forgets to turn off the RT 524 radio before starting the vehicle. The starting of the motor sends a surge of power into the RT 524 radio which destroys one of the modules in the squelch or power circuit. The replacement of this module cannot be accomplished at the organizational level and must be sent to support maintenance for replacement, thus deadlining the radio up to 20 days.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That the following be studied:

(1) Incorporate a fuse in the power cable assembly set to blow at a lower amperage than the modules.

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(2) Reroute the power cable through the ignition system so that power is diverted from the radio while the starter solenoid is engaged as in conventional automobiles.

(3) Incorporate a switch on the dashboard that must be in the position "on" for the radio to be operative but must be in the "off" position for the starter solenoid to be operative.

(2) Relocation of the antenna base and base extension on the M151A1 jeep.

(a) OBSERVATION: When the antenna is secured forward, as is normally the case for in-city driving, it is in continuous contact with the canvas top at the rear brace. The radio was not designed for the antenna to be tied down, nevertheless, it is generally utilized in that manner.

(b) EVALUATION: The rubbing of the antenna against the canvas top will create a hole in a very short period of time rendering the top unserviceable or at a minimum will require constant repair.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That the antenna base and base extension be mounted to the side of the vehicle instead of to the rear. In this position the antenna does not come in contact with the canvas top and brace. It would not require side clearance anymore than is presently required by the side mirror.

(3) Commo on XM-706 armored car.

(a) OBSERVATION: Problems have been encountered in communications on armored cars, XM-706. Due to the radio's close proximity to the engine, the RTC's location in relation to the radio, and the loud noise caused by an armored vehicle, some type of communication helmet or headset must be utilized to eliminate excessive noise and allow every member of the crew to monitor the radio, and to communicate between themselves.

(b) EVALUATION: Members of the crews have utilized GVC helmets, MK 1039-6 flight helmets, and H-140 G/R headsets with M-80 C/V microphones. Various problems have been encountered in their use:

(1) The GVC helmet (tanker's helmet) has been found to be extremely uncomfortable to those utilizing it for an extended period of time.

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AVBGF-IC

31 October 1970


SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) The MK 1039-6 flight helmet has proven to be the most practical and comfortable. However, these helmets utilize maximum output of the amplifier, thus overworking the entire intercom system.

(3) The H-140 G/R headset and microphone M-80 C/V has been found to be extremely uncomfortable, due to the fact that a steel helmet must be worn over the head band.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the MK 1039-6 flight helmet be authorized and adopted by the United States Army as an organic element of the XM-706 communication system. It is further recommended that the helmet and the intercom control box of the armored car be modified to render them adaptable to each other.

1 Incl
Organizational Chart


JAMES P. DUFFY, JR.
LTC, MFC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Commander-In-Chief, USARPAC, ATTN: GROD-DT, APO 96558
- 3 - Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96307
- 5 - Commanding Officer, 16th MP Gp, ATTN: AVBGF-B, APO 96349

2) AVBGF-B (31 Oct 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 16TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP, APO 96349 16 November 1970

TO: Commanding General, 18th Military Police Brigade, ATTN: AVBGC-O,
APO 96491

1. (U) The ORLL for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 for the 93d Military Police Battalion, APO 96238 is submitted.

2. (U) The report is considered adequate. The following comments refer to the parts of the report indicated.

a. Reference paragraph 2a(1): Concur. A conscientious effort should be made to make active service as attractive as possible to the individual serviceman and a comprehensive in-service education program would be a step in the right direction. This is particularly true at this time when the service is pushing an all volunteer army.

b. Reference paragraph 2a(2): Concur. Newly promoted E-5's should be given an opportunity to sever the close friendships of his prior service by transferring to a new unit where he can establish the proper relationship with his subordinates.

c. Reference paragraph 2b(1): Concur. New tactics employed by enemy forces should be disseminated to all forces in Vietnam on a continuing basis.

d. Reference paragraph 2b(2): Concur. Billet areas should be illuminated and guards should be posted when possible for security.

e. Reference paragraph 2c(1): Concur. New enemy tactics should be disseminated to all effected branches on a continuing basis.

f. Reference paragraph 2c(2): Concur. Utilization of LOH aircraft is acceptable for this mission.

g. Reference paragraph 2c(3): Concur. Convoy commanders should be aware of this tactic used by the enemy.

h. Reference paragraph 2c(4): Concur. Guidance should be published on the appropriate level to make units aware of their responsibilities for deserters apprehended by the Military Police.

i. Reference paragraph 2e(1): Concur. An effort should be made during AIT to insure that only properly motivated and trained personnel are sent to the combat zone. Training in Vietnam should be held to the minimum essential to meet mandatory DA and USARV requirements.

AVBOF-B (31 Oct 70) 1st Ind 16 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

j. Reference paragraph 2f(1): Concur. Defects in equipment should be corrected by the manufacturer.

k. Reference paragraph 2f(2): Concur with need to develop a locking device on barrel locking lever of M-60 machine gun. However, it is also incumbent on gunners to properly check equipment before beginning a mission. This lever would then be found unsecure and could be secured.

l. Reference paragraph 2f(3): Concur. V-100's need some type windshield that can deflect rain and debris away from the drivers face.

m. Reference paragraph 2f(4): Concur. Polished steel mirrors would be more practical for mirror boxes. Stop watches should be added to MP unit TOE's as expendable items.

n. Reference paragraph 2f(5): Concur. AMC should make every effort to assure that proper repair parts are available for V-100's.

o. Reference paragraph 2f(6): Concur. Stretchers should be carried on V-100's for use in handling casualties. This is being done by units of this Group and they have proved invaluable during enemy ambushes for moving casualties to safety in armored vehicles.

p. Reference paragraph 2f(7): Concur. Sufficient quantities of proper repair parts should be made available to preclude necessity for issue of substitute items.

q. Reference paragraph 2g(1): Concur. The installation of the recommended modifications would preclude many time consuming deadlines for this critical communications equipment.

r. Reference paragraph 2g(2): Concur. This modification would preclude damage to vehicle canvas and save money.

s. Reference paragraph 2g(3): Concur. A headset incorporated into a protective helmet is essential to proper and effective communications on the V-100.

Jonathan S. Hill
for: GLEN A. HILL
COL, MPC
Commanding

CF: CO, 93d MP Bn

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AVBGC-O (31 Oct 70) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFCR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96491 19 December 1970


TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO
96375

1. Page 8, paragraph 1g. The information in this paragraph, pertaining to the location of the 66th MP Co as listed under Force Development should have been noted under the Operations section (para 1d). The Force Development section should be restricted to actions pertaining to the restructure of units and the documentation of personnel and equipment authorizations IAW AR 310-49, TAADS. Gail: has been notified.

2. Concur with all Lessons Learned.

3. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


GEORGE F. PROUDFOOT
Colonel, MPC
Deputy Commander

CF:
CO, 16th MP Gp
CO, 93d MP Bn

AVHDO-DO (31 Oct 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 93d Military Police Battalion and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "The Loss of Potential Army Career Men," page 9, paragraph 2a(1) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a: concur with the recommendation stated in the 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a. The current trend within the Army is towards more liberalized degree completion programs. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Reassignments for newly promoted Sergeants E-5," page 10, paragraph 2a(2) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b: concur with the action proposed as stated in 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. Reference item concerning "M-73 Machine Guns," page 13, paragraph 2f(1) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2j: concur. The deficiency should be reported to USA Weapons Command through submission of an Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR) by the unit concerned. The unit has been informed to submit an EIR. Also, a technical representative from LAOV will also look into the problem in the unit. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

d. Reference item concerning "Barrel Locking Lever on the M-60 machine gun," page 14, paragraph 2f(2) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2k: concur in part with the recommendation. As part of prefiring procedures, firers should check to insure that the barrel is properly locked into position prior to firing. This should be included as a part of unit operator training. Additionally, the unit has been informed to submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR) on the barrel locking lever for USA Weapons Command's evaluation. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

e. Reference item concerning "Windshields for XM-706 Armored Car," page 14, paragraph 2f(3) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2l: concur. TACOM has been testing such a windshield in Korea and reports of its use are favorable. TACOM plans a modification for vehicles in the future. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

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AVHDO-DO (31 Oct 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

f. Reference item concerning "Mirror Boxes," page 14, paragraph 2f(4) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2m: concur with comment that stop watches not be repaired in Vietnam. They can be obtained through supply with authorization. Recommend 93d Military Police Battalion request MTOE. Nonconcur with comment that mirrors need be purchased on the economy. Recommend unit coordinate with supply support to find substitute item or report the equipment on EIR as unsuitable for field use. Substitution of polished metal is considered an adequate field substitute. Unit has been so advised.

g. Reference item concerning "Slave cylinders for XM-706 armored car," page 15, paragraph 2f(5) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2n: concur. TACOM is currently studying this problem. ARVN V100 vehicles have been experiencing the same difficulty. It appears that the newer cylinders procured under the same FSN have different part numbers. This is further complicated by the various models of XM-706 produced by Cadillac Gage. TACOM will inform this command as soon as the problem is resolved. Unit has been so advised.

h. Reference item concerning "Personnel Stretchers," page 15, paragraph 2f(6) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2o: nonconcur. While it is recognized that in some instances, a personnel stretcher could be a valuable asset, all the uses of the XM-706 vehicles would not justify this item. Commanders at battalion or higher levels could authorize use of this item with their own equipment if deemed appropriate. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

i. Reference item concerning "Rear Ends on XM-706 armored car," page 15, paragraph 2f(7) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2p: concur. These items have been short in-country. ICCV currently has these items back-ordered in CONUS. TACOM is currently investigating the short life experienced on this assembly. USARV is attempting to expedite shipments to fill requisitions. Unit has been so advised.

j. Reference item concerning "Tire rims for XM-706," page 16, paragraph 2f(8): concur in that FSN 2530-287-5701 was an incorrect substitution for FSN 2530-934-2360. This discrepancy was corrected by the CONUS NICP and a contract for FSN 2530-934-2360 was let in November 1970. ETA of 62 each FSN 2530-934-2360 in USARV is May 1971. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

k. Reference item concerning "Improvement of the RT 524 radio," page 16, paragraph 2g(1) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2q. Information and recommendations have been submitted to USAECOM Area Office, RVN for evaluation. Recommend that all operators of Radio Sets AN/VRC-46 and AN/VRC-47 be given training and instruction on proper operation of radio sets to preclude damage to RT 524. Unit has been so advised.


AVHDO-DO (31 Oct 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

l. Reference item concerning "Relocation of the antenna base and base extension on the M151A1 jeep," page 17, paragraph 2g(2) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2r. Information and recommendations have been submitted to USAECOM Area Office, RVN for evaluation. Recommend that a portion of split rubber hose or similar material be placed on the canvas to prevent damage until proper evaluation can be made by USAECOM. Unit has been so advised.

m. Reference item concerning "Commo on XM-706 armored car," page 17, paragraph 2g(3) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2s: nonconcur. The intercommunications system utilized in the XM-706 is the AN/VIC-1. Headset - Microphone H-161/U or H-161A/U is issued as part of the installation unit for this intercom system. Use of Headset - Microphone H-161/U has not been attempted according to ORLL. TM 11-5965-262-13 dtd February 1966 indicates that the H-161/U is designed to be worn under the M1 Infantry Helmet. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
18th MP Bde
93d MP Bn

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GPOP-DT (31 Oct 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 93d Military Police Battalion for
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 4 MAY 1971


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGO
Asst AC

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



LEGEND

- _____ Assigned
- Attached

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(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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CO, 93d Military Police Battalion			
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